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Notes & Comments
Chambers v. Ormiston: The Harmful
and Discriminatory Avoidance of the
Laws of Comity and Public Policy for
Valid Same-Sex Marriages
Jared B. Arader*
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2007, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island did
something that no other state high court has done: faced squarely
with the issue of whether out-of-state same-sex marriages should
be recognized, it punted on a jurisdictional technicality.'
The issue in the case, Chambers v. Ormiston,2 was whether
two Rhode Island women, who were legally married in
Massachusetts, could obtain a divorce from the Rhode Island
*Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2011, Roger Williams University School of
Law. B.A., State University of New York at Purchase, May 2008. The author
would like to thank Professor Courtney Cahill of Roger Williams University
School of Law for committing many hours to helping explore this area of the
law. Also, the author greatly appreciates the valuable suggestions and
criticisms provided by Martha Holt, Esq, and all members of the Rhode
Island Lawyers for Equality and Diversity (LEAD).
1. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007). See also Matthew J.
Skinner, Comment, To Harm, To Victimize, And To Destroy: The Ugly Reason
Why the Chambers Majority Opinion was So Right, 72 ALB. L. REV. 825, 827
(2009) ("In a three-to-two split, the court ultimately concluded that . . . the
Rhode Island Family Court today did not have jurisdiction to entertain a
divorce petition of a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts .....
2. 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007).
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Family Court, the only avenue available to them as Rhode Island
residents. 3 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island said no. 4
The issue here, the foreign recognition of valid same-sex
marriages, reaches back to 1993. In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the Hawaiian government must show a
compelling reason for limiting same-sex marriage to opposite-sex
couples.5
This decision became a national concern for conservatives
when commentators on both sides on the issue began postulating
that, under either the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution or the common-law doctrine of comity, all states
would have to afford the rights of marriage to same-sex couples
married validly in other states.6 The response to this was the
"Defense of Marriage Act" of 1996 (DOMA), which codified the
existing law of comity and its accompanying public policy
exception, granting states a reprieve from recognition of any
validly performed same-sex marriage.7
The catch, however, is that this is merely a bar to
enforcement under federal law. This limitation invites States to
enact individual state DOMAs or pass legislation restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples. Additionally, some states have
amended their constitutions to define the contours of marriage as
purely heterosexual. Forty-one states currently have some form of
3. Id. at 970, (Suttell, J., dissenting) (discussing that under Rhode
Island law, divorces are only heard by the Family Court, which hasjurisdiction over all divorces arising among Rhode Island residents); see also
Cote-Whiteacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 631 (Mass. 2006)
(holding that non-Massachusetts residents from states that do not recognize
same-sex marriages could be afforded a valid marriage in Massachusetts);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that the state of Massachusetts could not deny same-sex couples the right to
marriage under the state constitution).
4. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 963.
5. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The decision was short-lived, however.
Soon afterwards, a movement to amend the Hawaii constitution to define
marriage as between a man and a woman began. This amendment, HRS
Const. art I, §23 was passed in November of 1998. It reads: "The legislature
shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 23.
6. Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus
Public Policy in Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic
Relations, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1855, 1860 (2008).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2003).
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prohibition on their books, either in the form of a state DOMA, a
statutory prohibition, or a constitutional prohibition against same-
sex marriages. 8
New York, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico and Rhode Island
have no laws regarding the recognition of valid out-of-state same-
sex marriages.9 This lack of statutory authority prompted Rhode
Island's Attorney General, Patrick Lynch, to issue an advisory
opinion arguing that the state must recognize such marriages. 10
The opinion, which is not binding, conflicts with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's assertion in Chambers that persons in a valid
same-sex marriage cannot be granted a divorce in the state's
courts. The Rhode Island legislature, to date, has taken no action;
it has not recognized same-sex marriages, affirmatively denied
them, or codified its public policy exception. 11  This causes
confusion in interpreting the laws of the state: for what purposes
will a marriage be recognized, and for which will it not?
The position of this Comment is that Rhode Island must
recognize all valid out of state same-sex marriages for all
purposes. Rhode Island is behind the times, as it is surrounded by
states that recognize same-sex marriages. Indeed, all of New
England excluding Maine and Rhode Island now does So.12
8. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions,
http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage-prohibitions_2009.pdf [hereinafter
Statewide Marriage Prohibitions]. The number has, at times, been higher.
Iowa and Connecticut have both had statutes restricting marriage to one man
and one woman, both of which have been declared unconstitutional by both
state's courts. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan
v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
9. Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, supra note 8.
10. Memorandum from Patrick Lynch, Attorney General of the State of
Rhode Island, to Jack R. Warner, Commissioner of Rhode Island Board of
Governors for Higher Education, (Feb. 20, 2007) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Lynch] (memorandum in response to a question by the
Commissioner as to whether employees of state universities must have their
personnel file statuses changed to "married" as a result of being married to a
person of the same sex in Massachusetts).
11. See Cynthia Needham, Why Rhode Island Stands Alone in New
England on Same-Sex Marriage, PROVIDENCE J., May 9, 2009, at 1; see also
Katherine Gregg, Carcieri Vetoes Bill Allowing Partners to Plan Funerals,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 11, 2009, at 1 (Rhode Island's governor, Donald Carcieri,
vetoed a bill passed by the legislature that would allow domestic partners
funerary rights over a recently deceased loved one).
12. See Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke Might Result in Change in
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009 at A25.
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This Comment seeks to demonstrate how, using Rhode Island
as a model, the doctrine of comity, where applied properly, clearly
works in favor of same-sex couples married validly, but currently
living in states where the law is silent on the issue. The law of
comity is an answer that confers the full panoply of state-marriage
benefits upon a couple once validly married anywhere. With it,
the courts need not parse out the different benefits and burdens
for which a marriage will apply. A proper and just decision on the
issue of comity as it applies to same-sex marriages would have a
tremendous impact on the nationwide issue of same-sex
marriages. 13
Part I of this Comment examines the decision in Chambers,
addressing both the majority and the dissenting opinions,
discussing why the dissent was correct in its analysis of state
statutory law that would have granted the right of same-sex
couples to divorce. Part II discusses in greater detail the history
of using comity and public policy to recognize foreign marriages.
Part III sets forth how the public policy exception to the comity
doctrine should be applied in Rhode Island. In such, this
Comment contends that Rhode Island should apply comity
broadly, to encompass the full recognition of foreign same-sex
marriages. This Comment concludes by illustrating that comity
has protected a range of couples throughout American history, and
it has consistently furthered the virtues of equality and justice.
Recognizing same-sex marriage is in accordance with this
tradition.
I. CHAMBERS V. ORMISTON: A TALE OF LOST LOVE AND NEVER-
ENDING MARRIAGE
Margaret Chambers and Cassandra Ormiston, both Rhode
Island residents, were married in Fall River, Massachusetts on
May 26, 2004.14 The right of same-sex couples to marry in
13. This Comment does not address issues pertaining to Equal Protection
or the oft-debated argument regarding whether valid same-sex marriages
must be recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. See Andrew Koppelman, Recognition and Enforcement of
Same-Sex Marriage: Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2143, 2146 (2005)
(arguing that many people "confusedly" believe that interstate recognition of
valid same sex marriages is a Full Faith and Credit issue).
14. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I. 2007).
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Massachusetts had been recognized by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in the landmark case of Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health.15 The couple returned to Rhode
Island and resided together for two years until they decided to
dissolve their marriage. 16 Accordingly, Ms. Ormiston petitioned
the Rhode Island Family Court for divorce on October 27, 2006
and Ms. Chambers answered and counterclaimed a week later. 17
The Rhode Island Family Court is a statutory court, with
jurisdiction to "hear and determine all petitions from the bond of
marriage."18 Despite the Family Court's jurisdiction over "all
petitions," Family Court Chief Judge Jeremiah S. Jeremiah, Jr.
expressed hesitance at granting this particular divorce. 19 No
state that did not explicitly recognize same-sex marriage had ever
granted a divorce from one performed in another jurisdiction
before and Judge Jeremiah was unsure how to proceed given
Rhode Island's complete lack of same-sex marriage legislation,
permissive or prohibitory. 20 To resolve the confusion, the Family
Court certified the question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.21
After remanding for fact finding, the Supreme Court heard
the case, asking whether the Family Court Act allowed the Family
Court "to grant a divorce to the instant parties, who are described
in the certified question as two persons of the same-sex who were
purportedly married in another state."22 In other words, is a valid
gay marriage treated the same as a heterosexual marriage for the
purpose of divorce?
Justice William P. Robinson, writing for a majority that
included then-Chief Justice Frank Williams and Justice Francis
15. 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); see also Cote-Whiteacre v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 631 (Mass. 2006) (holding that non-
Massachusetts residents from states that did not have any statutory or
judicial non-recognition of same-sex marriages could be afforded a valid
marriage in Massachusetts).
16. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 958-59.
17. Id. at 959.
18. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a) (1997) (Known as the "Family Court Act,"
the statute reads: "There is hereby established a family court, consisting of a
chief judge and eleven (11) associate justices, to hear and determine all
petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board. .
19. See Chambers, 935 A.2d at 959.
20. See Skinner, supra note 1, at 826.
21. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 959.
22. Id. at 961 (internal quotations omitted).
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Flaherty, decided that in order to answer this question, the court
must first inquire whether the statute was ambiguous. 23 Justice
Robinson began this analysis by attempting to divine the meaning
of the word "marriage" as understood by the legislature in 1961,
when the statute was enacted.24 Relying on the default "plain
meaning" rule of statutory construction, Justice Robinson looked
to three contemporary dictionaries, finding that the meaning of
marriage, as understood by the legislature then, could have been
nothing more than that consisting of a man and a woman.25 Thus,
in his view, the statute was unambiguous.
Recognizing that this was "no ordinary case,"26  Justice
Robinson justified his logic under an alternative line of reasoning,
declaring that the result would have been the same under the
canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, which instructs
courts to look at other words associated with the ambiguous term
in question. 27 In his analysis, Justice Robinson looked at other
provisions of the general laws relating to marriage, finding them
all to consist of a male party and a female party.28 All of these
statutes, he found, employed gendered terms, leading him to
conclude that even if the statute were ambiguous, it was clearly
meant to constrict the jurisdiction of the family courts to
marriages consisting of one man and one woman. 29
The dissent, authored by now-Chief Justice Paul Suttell, and
joined by Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg, argued that "the
legal recognition that ought to be afforded same-sex marriages for
any particular purpose is fundamentally a question of public
23. Id.
24. Id. at 961-62.
25. Id.at 962.
26. Id. at 963 n.16 ("Although in the ordinary case we would not engage
in an analysis pursuant to a canon of statutory construction after we had
found a statute to be unambiguous, we recognize that this is no ordinary
case, and we believe that such an analysis would be informative and useful to
the public at large in this instance.").
27. Id. at 964 (citing State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1161 (R.I. 2000)
("[T]he meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases
associated with it.")); see also LATIN FOR LAWYERS 208 (The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 1992) ("The meaning of a word may be ascertained by
reference to those associated with it.").
28. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 964-65 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1, 15-1-2
(2003), § 15-2-1, 15-2-7 (2003), § 11-6-1 (2002)).
29. See id.
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policy, more appropriately determined by the General Assembly
after full and robust public debate." 30 In other words, Chief
Justice Suttell would, had he been writing for the majority, have
only decided the issue as relating to divorce, and not as it relates
to same-sex marriage in general.
The dissent's primary contention with the majority's holding
is that it addressed the wrong issue. The parties' marriage, Chief
Justice Suttell wrote, is valid in Massachusetts, and must be
recognized under the statute's language granting the Family
Court jurisdiction to hear "all" petitions for divorce from
marriage.31 The dissent declared that it would have been "quite
extraordinary" for the drafters of the 1961 legislation to have
contemplated same-sex marriages. 32 But, argued the dissent, the
court must instead look to the "breadth and objectives" of the
statute to resolve all matters of domestic relations, instead of how
legislators in 1961 may have envisioned marriage.33
The dissent also argued that the Court indeed had jurisdiction
under a separate statute, Rhode Island General Law § 15-5-1,
enacted five years prior to the Family Court's establishment in
1956. The statute states that: "[D]ivorces from the bond of
marriage shall be decreed in case of any marriage originally void
or voidable by law . . . ." 34 According to Chief Justice Suttell, this
provision provides the Family Court plenary power to entertain
any divorce, whether or not it is valid in Rhode Island, without
having to necessarily assess its validity. 35 It is telling to note that
this statute is not cited or discussed by the majority. This statute
would allow parties to a bigamous or incestuous marriage, both of
which are void under Rhode Island law, to petition the Family
Court for divorce. 36 Therefore, even if the majority's analysis of
the Family Court's jurisdiction was dependant on the definition of
marriage as understood by the legislature at the time, same-sex
marriages would be precisely the "void or voidable" sort of
marriage for which this statute pertains to.
30. Id. at 967 (Suttell, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 970-71 (Suttell, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 971 (Suttell, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-1 (1956).
35. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 972 (Suttell, J, dissenting).
36. Id.
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Finally, the dissent noted that Rhode Island has recognized
the rule of lex loci celebrationis, a common law maxim meaning
that the capacity to marry is determined by the law of the
jurisdiction where the marriage is to take place, and must be
recognized unless it is opposed to the stated public policy of the
jurisdiction.3 7 Chief Justice Suttell reiterated that even if the
public policy exception operated to bar a foreign marriage in
Rhode Island, the state's statutes give the courts a way to hear the
petition for divorce anyway. 38 R.I. General Law § 15-5-1, he
noted, would still allow the Family Court to hear a divorce from
such a valid marriage declared void for being against the strong
public policy of the state. 39 As the dissent makes clear, despite
whatever interpretation a 1961 legislature may have had, it
should be clear that a petition for divorce for any marriage, valid
or invalid, void or voidable, in Rhode Island, must be entertained
by the Family Court.
The dissent refrained from arguing that Rhode Island law
should recognize same-sex marriages performed validly for all
purposes, and not just for divorce, when fully analyzed under
principles of comity and public policy. 40 Whether it is because full
recognition was not the issue presented to them or purely for
purposes of judicial restraint is unclear. The position of this
Comment, however, is that the doctrine of comity and public policy
will grant full recognition to all marriages, and not only for
isolated incidences. The next two sections will explore the
contours of the doctrine. This Comment argues for full recognition
for all marriages performed validly outside of Rhode Island and
other jurisdictions that similarly do not have positive prohibitions
on same-sex marriage.
37. Id. (Suttell, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Chace, 58 A. 978, 979 (R.I.
1904)).
38. Id. at 973 (Suttell, J., dissenting).
39. Id. ("As we previously have noted, however, even if the presumption
of validity of a Massachusetts same-sex marriage were rebutted by a showing
that it was 'strongly against the public policy' of Rhode Island, or if the
General Assembly declared it as such, the Family Court would not be
deprived of authority to entertain a petition seeking to dissolve the
marriage.").
40. See id.
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II. COMITY AND THE STRONG PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO
RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGES FROM FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
In 2007, months before Chambers was decided, Attorney
General of Rhode Island Patrick Lynch took the position that
same-sex couples who had legally married in Massachusetts
should be afforded full legal recognition in Rhode Island.41 He
reiterated his position in the Chambers case. 42 The Attorney
General's argument is simple and persuasive: because Rhode
Island lacks any law strictly prohibiting same-sex marriages,
comity must be granted to all same-sex marriages performed
validly in other jurisdictions. 43 This issue pertaining to comity
and the public policy exception is detailed below.
A. Comity and the Public Policy Exception
Under the doctrine of comity, a political entity affords
recognition, reciprocity and respect to the judgments of other
entities. 44 Comity is not a rule of law per se, but it is uniformly
employed by courts as a courtesy to judgments and contracts made
under the laws of fellow sovereigns.45
In the context of marriage, the general rule of comity is that a
marriage that is valid where entered into will be recognized in all
other states except those that have a strong public policy against
that marriage. 46 This public policy exception to the rule of
41. See Lynch, supra note 10.
42. See Brief for State of Rhode Island as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Parties, Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (No. 2006-0340
M.P.).
43. Id. at* *16.
44. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 114 (3d Pocket ed. 2006) ("A practice among
political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions),
involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.");
see also Gennaro Savastano, Comment, Comity of Errors: Foreign Same-sex
Marriages in New York, 24 TouRo L. REV. 199, 208 (2008) (describing the
necessity of the doctrine to deal "properly and fairly" with the high
magnitude of decrees and judgments stemming from courts that would
ordinarily be put at risk due to the different laws of different states and
nations).
45. See Obrien v. Costello, 216 A.2d 694, 699 (R.I. 1966).
46. Ex parte Chace, 58 A. 978, 980 (R.I. 1904) ("[A] well-recognized
exception to the general rule laid down above, namely, that if a marriage is
odious by the common consent of nations, or if its influence is thought
dangerous to the fabric of society, so that it is strongly against the public
2010] 195
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marriage recognition exists to protect a sovereign political entity's
ability to define its own laws. In American law, the general rule of
comity has been partially codified by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.47 Thus, the Constitution ensures
that the judgment of a state court should have the same credit,
validity and effect in every court in the United States that it had
in the state where it was pronounced, preventing states from
acting as foreign sovereigns to one another, ignoring binding
obligations created by each state.48
Comity and conflicts of laws, however, are inherently broader
than the Full Faith and Credit Clause. These concepts apply not
only to judgments, but also to obligations that arise according to a
state's laws, such as marriage. Comity creates an exception from
forcing a sovereign entity-here, the fifty states that form the
United States of America-from recognizing such obligations if
they are against the strong public policy of that entity.49 Thus,
when dealing with an obligation from a foreign state
(Massachusetts and Rhode Island are indeed foreign to each
other), a state may apply traditional conflict of laws principles in
order to determine whether to honor the obligation as made
pursuant to another state's law.
B. The Evolution of the Public Policy Exception Doctrine
The rules regarding whether a marriage under one state's
laws will be recognized by another state are no different than the
general rule of comity as applied to all laws. The Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws states the rule: "[A] marriage which
satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it
violates the strong public policy of another state which had the
most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at
policy of the jurisdiction, it will not be recognized there, even though valid
where it was solemnized.").
47. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
48. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1942) (quoting
Hampton v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235 (1818)).
49. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979).
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the time of the marriage."50 This principle is built on the common
law rule of lex loci celebrationis, which states that the validity of a
marriage is to be determined by the law of the state where it is
entered into, and only need not be honored and given the effect of
comity if it violates the strong public policy of the jurisdiction.51
A brief history of the emergence of the doctrine in American
law is essential to understanding the doctrine. In Anglo-American
jurisprudence, the public policy rule has been applied to
recognition of marriages as early as 1567.52 There, in the case of
Cartwright's Case, an Englishman who brought a slave from
Russia was brought before England's Star Chamber. The court
was loathe to endorse slavery and it set the slaves free, declaring
that "England was too pure an air for slaves to breathe in."53 The
so-called "Pure Air" rule was cited by early American courts faced
with the issue of whether slaves, upon entering a non-slave state,
were instantly freed. 54 As noted by Professor Lynn D. Wardle,
some colonies applied this "pure air" rule, which could also be
thought of as a form of instant emancipation, while other colonies
allowed a slave to pass through its territory but did not permit
them to remain there in perpetual bondage. 55 The difference,
Wardle writes, was whether or not the states had banned slavery,
or were in a period of gradual emancipation. 56
The rationale gradually expanded to interstate recognition of
interracial marriages. 57 While comity was a default position
under American law pursuant to the U.S. Constitution as
discussed above, states that prohibited interracial marriages
generally prohibited recognition of interracial marriages when
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).
51. Savastano, supra note 44, at 210; see also Ex parte Chace, 58 A. at
979 (holding that lex loci celebrationis is the law in Rhode Island).
52. Wardle, supra note 6, at 1871.
53. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The author argued that the case
reflects "the notion that slavery was incompatible with the strong domestic
policy in England in favor or recognizing the liberty of all individuals in
England" and that it overrode any considerations of comity. Id. at 1872.
54. Id. at 1876-77 (suggesting that slavery, not based on natural law or
common law principles, could only exist and be enforced where there was
positive law to allow it).
55. Id. at 1885-86.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1893.
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validly performed elsewhere. 58 In the 1819 Massachusetts case of
Medway v. Needham, an interracial couple married in Rhode
Island in order to evade Massachusetts' laws prohibiting
miscegenation. 59  The marriage, the court held, could be
recognized in Massachusetts, despite the couple's intent to violate
the laws that would prohibit their marriage in Massachusetts,
because the marriage did not violate public policy. 60 So long as
such a valid marriage does not cause "disastrous consequences" or
"public mischief, which would result from the loose state, in which
people situated would live," then the foreign marriage must be
recognized, despite the fact that it would be void had it been
performed in Massachusetts.6 1 Judicial application of comity in
the racial context has seen little usage or necessity in recent times
due to the U.S. Supreme Court's decisive holding in the 1967 case
of Loving v. Virginia,62 which held that laws prohibiting
interracial marriage violate the Constitution. The doctrine is still
binding law on all issues of comity, and, as this Comment argues,
same-sex couples will need to rely on it to determine the legal
status of their marriages.
C. The Public Policy Doctrine and Same-Sex Marriage
The rule of lex loci celebrationis has been voided for same-sex
marriages in forty-one states by way of "mini-DOMAs" and
constitutional amendments specifically banning recognition of any
valid same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions.63 The
authority for states to enact such law expressly denying comity is
found in the DOMA, which prohibits the federal government from
58. Id.
59. 16 Mass. 157, 159 (MA 1819). This case also stands for another
important principle of comity, forum evasion. This was often an issue
relating to interracial marriage, where an interracial couple would escape to
another state in order to avoid the criminal penalties of marriage in that
state. In this case, however, there was no clear public policy prohibiting
interracial marriages even where the couple married in a different state
simply to evade the laws proscribing such a marriage. As we can see, the
public policy bar in the nineteenth century was significantly lower, and
perhaps harder to distinguish, than it is today.
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id. at 160-61.
62. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding unconstitutional any state laws to
prevent marriage between persons based solely on racial criteria).
63. See Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, supra note 8.
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superseding state law regarding the recognition of same-sex
marriages. 64 State DOMAs can be utilized to suggest that such
marriages are contrary to the strong public policy of the state. 65
Additionally, as noted by Professor Andrew Koppelman, other
state laws could reflect a similar policy.6 6 Professor Koppelman
suggests, for instance, looking to incidental marriage benefits
provided under state law, such as the right to make medical
decisions for one's partner.67 A state's public policy, he argues,
would not be offended when a couple, married in another state,
attempts to claim this right absent some sort of statutory ban on
the couple's marriage.68
On the issue of same-sex marriage, there are few reported
cases discussing whether comity compels recognition of foreign
same-sex marriages. However, two courts have done so, and they
reached different results. These opinions shed light on the
current understanding of the doctrine. In the 2002 case of
Rosengarten v. Downes, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
Connecticut had a strong public policy against same-sex marriage,
evinced by a state statute, and, therefore, did not need to enact a
state DOMA to ban same-sex marriages. 69 The Rosengarten Court
64. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2003).
65. Koppelman, supra note 13, at 2149-50 (stating that by enacting such
laws, states employ a "blanket rule of nonrecognition" allowing them to
"ignore marriage licenses granted to same-sex couples in other states")
(internal citations omitted).
66. Id. at 2153. Professor Koppelman further suggests that statutory law
declaring homosexual sex to be criminal sodomy would have served as an
example to suggest a strong public policy against the recognition of same-sex
marriages, however such laws have, indeed, been declared unconstitutional
and void following Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring all state
laws criminalizing private consensual sex acts between adults
unconstitutional).
67. Id. at 2145.
68. Id.
69. 802 A.2d 170, 182 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). While this case, regarding
the recognition of a Vermont civil union under the public policy exception has
been limited by Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 407, which held that the Connecticut
constitution guaranteed the right of same sex couples to marry, it still stands
as an example of how the public policy exception to comity has been tested
and used to deny recognition. Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 180. The court also
discussed the fact that a civil union was not a "marriage" under Vermont law
as a reason for not allowing it to be recognized as a marriage under
Connecticut law, but its discussion of comity and public policy in terms of the
state's strong public policy stance on opposite-sex marriage would
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explicitly found a statutory policy against same-sex marriages in
Connecticut General Statute § 45a-727a. 70  The Rosengarten
Court also referenced debate by the Connecticut legislature on
whether a state DOMA was needed in light of § 45a-727a. 71
In 2006, the New York State Court of Appeals held that,
under the state's equal protection clause, the state was not
required to grant marriages to same-sex couples. 72 Despite this
pronouncement, two years later the Fourth Department of the
New York Supreme Court-Appellate Division held in Martinez v.
County of Monroe that validly married same-sex couples must
have their marriage recognized in New York under the doctrine of
comity. 73  This sentiment was echoed two years following
Martinez by New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, in
Justice Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick's concurring opinion in
Godfrey v. Spano.74
The Godfrey concurrence, like the Martinez majority, applied
presumably apply the same way to a valid same-sex marriage. Id. at 174-75,
179-82.
70. Id. at 181. "It is further found that the current public policy of the
state of Connecticut is now limited to a marriage between a man and a
woman." Id., (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-727a (2000)).
71. Id. at 182.
72. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
73. Martinez v. County of Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189, 191 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008).
74. Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. 2009) (Ciparick, J,
concurring). Godfrey involved the right of state executives to order agencies
under their control to recognize valid same sex marriages for the purpose of
state benefits. Id. at 330. The majority held that same sex marriages,
performed validly out-of-state, could be recognized for the purpose of state
employee benefits. Id. at 376. The holding was limited, however, to the issue
of benefits. Id. Judge Ciparick, in a concurring opinion, argued that the
decision should cover complete recognition. Id. at 337 (Ciparick, J.,
concurring). In Martinez, the intermediate appellate court ordered the full
recognition of same sex marriages by a state college under public policy
grounds. Martinez, 50 A.D.3d 189. This decision, however, is not binding
statewide, unlike Godfrey. Thus, while the argument under Martinez that
same sex marriages must be recognized is still good law for the parties it
applied to (college employees), its command that foreign same-sex marriages
must be recognized is not as strong as the command under Godfrey, that
marriages must be recognized for the sole purpose of certain employment
benefits when directed by the administrator of that agency. Godfrey, 920
N.E.2d 328; Martinez, 50 A.D.3d 189; see also Jeremy W. Peters, New York to
Back Same-Sex Unions from Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at Al
(three months after Martinez, Governor David Paterson ordered all state
agencies under his control to recognize same-sex marriages).
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a New York version of the public-policy test, where comity would
not be granted if the marriage was prohibited by either positive
law of the state or by natural law. 75 The court in Martinez held
that "absent any New York statute expressing clearly the
Legislature's intent to regulate within this State marriages of its
domiciliaries solemnized abroad, there is no positive law in this
jurisdiction to prohibit recognition of a marriage that would have
been invalid if solemnized in New York."76 Because the state
legislature had not enacted any legislation strictly prohibiting the
recognition of same-sex marriages entered into validly in foreign
jurisdictions, then the marriage must be upheld in New York. 77
The Court of Appeals declined to hear an appeal of the Martinez
decision, upholding its decision to use comity to order the
recognition of the marriages at issue, but not enshrining comity as
the vehicle to recognizing same-sex marriages for all purposes
statewide.78
Further discussion of how the Martinez court circumvented
the possible public policy against same-sex marriage that could be
inferred from Hernandez is discussed below. It is worth noting at
this point that the Martinez rule, requiring an explicit prohibition
against foreign same-sex marriages, is more restrictive than what
the laws of comity generally require to show a strong public policy.
Martinez thus requires that the prohibition discriminate between
performing the marriages within the state or excluding those from
outside of the state. Despite this, both Rosengarten and
Martinez/Godfrey highlight the modern framework discussed by
Professor Koppelman and set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
75. Godfrey, 920 N.E.2d at 338-39 (Ciparick, J, concurring).
76. Martinez, 50 A.D.3d at 192 (quoting Matter of May, 305 N.Y. 486, 493
(N.Y. 1953)).
77. Id.; see also Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 338 (N.Y. 2009)
(Ciparick, J., concurring) ("Although the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) authorizes the states to pass so-called "mini-DOMAs"-and many
states have done so-New York has not, and the Legislature has enacted no
other law expressly forbidding the recognition of same-sex marriages
performed in other jurisdictions or expressing any legislative intent that such
marriages be voided. Thus, the positive law exception to recognizing out-of-
state same-sex marriages does not apply." (internal citations omitted)).
78. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 889 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y. 2008)
("Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought
to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning
of the Constitution.").
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Conflict of Laws: state law must actively prohibit recognition of
the marriage in order to show a strong public policy that will deny
comity to the marriage. 79
D. Ex Parte Chace: The Public Policy Exception Benefiting
"Evasive" Marriages in Rhode Island
The public policy exception to the comity doctrine has only
appeared once in Rhode Island case law prior to the Chambers
dissent, in the case of Ex parte Chace.80 In May of 1899, Henry C.
Chace was appointed as the ward of Andrew D. Wilson. 81 Three
years later, Henry Chace married the future Elizabeth Chace in
Massachusetts, without the Wilson's written consent. This was
contrary to Rhode Island law, which required a ward to obtain the
written consent of his or her guardian before he or she could
receive a marriage license from the state.82 Additionally, other
state laws voided all contracts and bargains entered into by
79. Nothing about the test prescribed here, or this Comment in general,
should be construed to suggest that the author intends to close the door to
comity and public policy recognition in states that possess a law limiting
marriage to one man and one woman. While the test clearly grants comity
where there is no such law, the bar will, in the end, rely on the comity and
public policy jurisprudence of each individual state. As seen with
Rosengarten, laws limiting marriage are passed under a variety of
circumstances and in different means, each one susceptible to a different
level of interpretation by different state courts. See Memorandum of Douglas
F. Gansler, Attorney General of the State of Maryland to Hon. Richard S.
Madaleno, Jr., Maryland Senate, (Feb. 23, 2010) (on file with author)
(arguing that Maryland's laws limiting marriage in that state to a man and a
woman are not strong enough public policy to deny comity to same-sex
marriages because the law was not passed in reaction to gay marriages
performed in other states). In theory, a state's high court could find a state
limiting marriage to one man and one woman to not be a sufficient public
policy, depending on the circumstances of that statute's passage and the
state's laws on comity. Unfortunately, the door to comity recognition is indeed
shut for the twenty-nine states that have amended their state constitutions
to exclude same sex couples from marriage.
80. Exparte Chace, 58 A. 978, 980 (R.I. 1904).
81. Id. at 978-79 The decision gives little background as to why this
appointment was made other than, pursuant to Rhode Island law at the time,
that Ward became guardian because "on the ground that, from want of
discretion in managing his estate, [Chace] was likely to bring himself to
want." The decision says nothing of Chace's age other than that he was "a
person of full age."
82. Id. at 979.
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wards. 83 Apparently, such conditions and prerequisites did not
exist in order to obtain a marriage in Massachusetts. 84 The couple
returned to Rhode Island, where they lived for several months
until Wilson removed Henry Chace from the home.85 Mrs. Chace
then filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have her husband
liberated from Wilson's guardianship and returned to her.86
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, as a threshold matter,
engaged in a discussion of whether the couple was validly
married.87 Andrews argued, inter alia, that because Rhode Island
law voids any "contracts, bargains, and conveyances made by any
person under guardianship," that it is the policy of Rhode Island
law to deny validity to contracts entered into by a ward, even
those fulfilling the requirements of the law where it took place. 88
The court, however, disagreed with Mr. Andrews' arguments,
holding first that the capacity of the parties to marry depends on
the law of the place where the marriage occurred. 89 To hold
otherwise, the court rationalized, would mean that the validity of
the marriage depended on the domicile of the parties, wherever
they were, which would lead to confusion.90 To support this
proposition, the court cited Medway to demonstrate that even
marriages that may have the appearance of being conducted in a
different jurisdiction merely to evade the laws proscribing such a
marriage in the jurisdiction of domicile must be presumed non-
evasive. 91 The court next decided that an exception to this rule
would invalidate the marriage in the state of domicile only if the
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 978-79 (Mrs. Chace averred that "the respondent guardian
thereupon imprisoned Mr. Chace, and is now unlawfully restraining him of
his liberty ... ; that he is deprived of the companionship, assistance, and care
of his wife, which he desires; that he is not permitted to have social
intercourse with her, save in the presence of his guardian; and that he is
being treated in a manner inconsistent with the relation of guardian and
ward.").
87. Id. at 979.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 980 (citing Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Cons. 395, 417
(K.B. 1752)).
91. Id. (citing The Inhabitants of Medway v. The Inhabitants of
Needham, 16 Mass. 157 (Mass. 1819)).
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marriage is "odious by the common consent of nations, or if its
influence is thought dangerous to the fabric of society, so that it is
strongly against the public policy of the jurisdiction."92 Under this
analysis, the court declared Mr. Chace's marriage valid.93
The court, in dicta, suggested that polygamous and incestuous
marriages would "probably" fit the "odious by the consent of
nations" standard. 94  The Chace court looked for a present
prohibition of the specific type of marriage, by either positive
statutory law or generally accepted moral standards, in order to
identify the sort of "strong public policy" that would fit into its
narrow exception. 95 While the law invoked by Mr. Chace's
guardian voided marriages that took place in Rhode Island where
the ward had not received the consent of his guardian, it still
permitted wards to marry in general.
Ex parte Chace establishes that Rhode Island law conforms to
the general principles of comity: that a marriage entered into
validly in another jurisdiction must be valid in Rhode Island, even
if it would not be valid if entered into in Rhode Island, unless
there is reason, such as a state law, to cause the marriage to be
considered dangerous to the morals of the state, and generally
"odious."
As will be demonstrated, although the "odious by consent of
nations, or if its influence thought dangerous to the fabric of
society" standard is outdated, it can be updated and applied to
modern standards as a two-part test, using the same rationale as
the Rhode Island Supreme Court did in 1914.
III. THE RHODE ISLAND MODEL FOR COMITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
A. Shaping the Policy for Same-Sex Couples ...
Chief Justice Suttell, in his dissenting opinion in Chambers,
92. Exparte Chace, 58 A.2d at 980.
93. Id. at 981.
94. Id. at 980.
95. See id. The court here did not engage in a discussion as to whether
the marriage was prohibited under the "dangerous to the fabric of society"
exception, presumably because it was clear that such marriages are generally
allowed by the statute, only proscribing the marriage of a ward when he does
not obtain the consent of the guardian.
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addresses the question of the public policy exception as an "even
if' question: "[E]ven if the presumption of validity of a
Massachusetts same-sex marriage were rebutted by a showing
that it was strongly against the public policy of Rhode Island, or if
the General Assembly declared it as such, the Family Court would
not be deprived of authority to entertain a petition seeking to
dissolve the marriage."96
He thus addressed, but did not explain or apply the contours
of the public policy exception in Rhode Island, as laid down in Ex
parte Chace. There could be a number of reasons for this fact. As
stated earlier, judicial restraint is a likely reason. An
examination of Rosengarten, Godfrey, Martinez and Ex parte
Chace reveals that the public policy exception to the comity rule
slightly differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, this
Comment contends that its application to same-sex marriages in
American states should be relatively uniform: if the state has a
"mini-DOMIA" or statutory law codifying the state's public policy
against same-sex marriages or explicitly limited to heterosexual
marriages, there will be no recognition. But, without such a law,
the marriage must be recognized under principles of comity.97
As discussed earlier, the Godfrey concurrence, channeling the
Martinez court, subscribed to a simple test: look first to positive
law and ask if it specifically prohibits recognizing a type of
marriage. Next, look to natural law, and ask whether the
marriage in question has been traditionally disfavored, such as
polygamous or bigamous marriages. 98
96. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 973 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
97. See generally Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 182 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002); Godfrey, 920 N.E.2d at 337-40 (Ciparick, J., concurring); Martinez
v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Ex parte
Chace, 58 A. 978, 980 (R.I. 1904). One begins to see the emerging of a
counterargument: why not just add same- sex marriage to this list of natural
law exceptions? The difference is that these natural law exceptions are
deeply seated in American and English jurisprudence. As we see in the
footnote below, Judge Ciparick has used simple language to define what
should and should not fall into the natural law category, despite its standard
being so very subjective as to be almost impracticable for regular application.
98. Godfrey, 920 N.E.3d at 339 (Ciparick, J., concurring). Judge Ciparick
explains that the "natural law" exception can only be invoked where the
marriage is "offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree regarded
generally with abhorrence and thus not within the inhibitions of natural
2010]1 205
206 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:187
The language that governs the public policy exception under
Rhode Island law must be updated in order to ensure its modern
relevance. It can be broken down into a similar test, given how
the Ex parte Chace court first looked to state statutes to determine
that the type of marriage itself, in its form, was not necessarily
prohibited. This is the positive law aspect; the "odious by the
consent of nations, or if its influence is thought dangerous to the
fabric of society" standard. 99 Thus, the court's first task must be
to look to statutory enactments and case law on State public policy
to determine whether there is any indication of a strong public
policy that specifically prohibits recognition of that type of
marriage. This would comport with Professor Koppelman's
suggestion that a public policy proscribing valid same-sex
marriages from recognition in a forum that does not expressly
recognize gay marriage will be difficult to divine absent some sort
of positive statutory authority. 00 However, it also allows for
consideration of case law to factor into the analysis.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, section 283,
comment k generally concurs in requiring explicit prohibition in
order to find a strong public policy.101 Specifically, the comment
states that "the problem arises in a situation where the marriage
does not satisfy the requirements of the state of [domicile] and
where as a result the marriage would have been invalid if it had
been contracted in that state."102 Indeed, by "requirements," the
Restatement likely refers to whatever structure, either legislative
or common law, that the state requires as a condition precedent to
marriage; including those conditions that expressly void a
marriage, such as blood or familial relation, or in states possessing
law." Id. at 339 (Ciparick, J., concurring). Polygamous and bigamous
marriages, often proscribed by natural law, are also frequently proscribed by
positive law as well, as is the case in Rhode Island. See Martinez, 850
N.Y.S.2d at 742.
99. See generally Ex parte Chace, 58 A. at 980. The court's "odious by the
consent of nations, or if its influence is thought dangerous to the fabric of
society" language can be interpreted to be a general acknowledgement of
natural law here, particularly where it describes bigamous and polygamous
marriages. It would appear to fully comport with Judge Ciparick's suggestion
that these marriages are barred by natural law where they are offensive to
public morals to such a character as to be generally abhorred.
100. Koppelman, supra note 13, at 2153.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. k (1971).
102. Id.
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a state-DOMIA, the gender of the couples.
B. . . . And then Apply it in Rhode Island
Rhode Island law already proscribes the kinds of marriages
that may be entered in to. Chapter 1 of Title 15 of the Rhode
Island General Laws (R.I.G.L) contains six statutes prohibiting
certain types of marriages and placing limitations on permissible
ones. It is an exhaustive list. The first two sections, R.I.G.L §§
15-1-1 and 15-1-2 prohibit marriages between various blood-
related persons. 103 General Law §15-1-3, perhaps somewhat
redundantly, voids all incestuous marriages. 104 General Law § 15-
1-4 provides an exception to the incest prohibition, permitting
certain types of kindred marriages based on degrees of affinity
within the Jewish religion.105 General Law § 15-1-5 declares void
all bigamous marriages, particularly those where a person is not
yet divorced. 106 The same statute also declares void any marriage
entered into by a mentally incompetent person. 107 The difference
between each of these statutes and the one at issue in Ex parte
Chace is that, in Chace, the statute did not prohibit the Chaces'
marriage, it merely specified the method in which it must be
entered in to.108
The statutes here do much more; they place an outright
restriction on a certain marriage from occurring in Rhode Island.
Do they evince a strong public policy to prohibit these same
marriages where performed validly elsewhere? Unlike the
guardian consent provision, the statutes here allow no marriage at
all, as opposed to allowing a marriage pursuant to a precondition.
Under Professor Koppelman's analysis, the marriage prohibitions
as enacted today are inherently prohibitory, and thus would pass
muster as a public policy exception to recognition of these
103. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-1-1, -2 (1956).
104. Id. § 15-1-3 (1956).
105. Id. § 15-1-4 (1956).
106. Id. § 15-1-5 (1956).
107. Id.
108. See Ex parte Chace, 58 A. at 979 ("Pub. Laws 1898-99, p. 49, c.549 §
11, merely provides that no marriage license shall issue to a person under
guardianship without the written consent of the guardian.. . .").
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marriages. 109 Thus, carving out marriage statutes that expressly
prohibit certain types of marriage and declaring them void for all
purposes indicates a strong public policy towards denying
recognition to such marriages. This, however, is not the case with
same-sex marriage.
C. Can a Prohibitory Statute Imply a Prohibition that it Does
Not Expressly Assert?
Can a statute that prohibits incestuous marriages somehow
be read to automatically apply a total ban on same-sex marriages
as well, when it makes no mention of such marriages? The
argument of Rhode Island Governor Donald Carcieri in his amicus
curiae brief in Chambers contends that it can, and indeed does. 110
R.I. Gen Laws § 15-1-1 and 15-1-2 proscribe, respectively, twenty
different incestuous relationships for men and nineteen for
women. 111  All of these proscribed relationships are
heterosexual. 112
Presumably, however, brother and brother, a relationship not
expressly barred by either statute, would not be able to marry.
This is because General Law § 15-1-1 stands for the proposition
that a man cannot engage in an incestuous marriage to an
immediate degree of blood relation within his immediate family,
or one extended no more than one or two generations. Under the
positive law analysis, step one of our modified Ex parte Chace test,
one would presume marriages to any immediate family member to
be specifically prohibited through statutes that bar a host of
similar relationships. These thirty-nine relationships proscribed
109. See Koppelman, supra note 13, at 2153.
110. Brief for Governor Donald Carcieri as Amicus Curiae, Chambers v.
Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (No. 06-340-M.P), 2007 WL 6149056.
111. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1, -2 (1956).
112. Id. § 15-1-1 ("No man shall marry his mother, grandmother,
daughter, son's daughter, daughter's daughter, stepmother, grandfather's
wife, son's wife, son's son's wife, daughter's son's wife, wife's mother, wife's
grandmother, wife's daughter, wife's son's daughter, wife's daughter's
daughter, sister, brother's daughter, sister's daughter, father's sister, or
mother's sister."); Id. § 15-1-2 ("No woman shall marry her father,
grandfather, son, son's son, daughter's son, stepfather, grandmother's
husband, daughter's husband, son's daughter's husband, daughter's
daughter's husband, husband's father, husband's grandfather, husband's son,
husband's son's son, husband's daughter's son, brother, brother's son, sister's
son, father's brother, or mother's brother.").
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from marriage in Rhode Island indicate a strong public policy to
expressly prevent all incestuous marriages. Additionally, if the
first two are not enough, § 15-1-3 specifically voids all incestuous
marriages. 113
Using the Ex parte Chace framework and the modern trend of
looking for evidence of public policy in prohibitory statutes, a
couple validly married out of state whose relationship runs afoul
of Rhode Island law would not likely be granted comity in Rhode
Island. Therefore, a marriage between two brothers would not be
granted comity in Rhode Island considering the three statutes
that expressly proscribe such a marriage
Because the statute does not expressly ban a homosexual
relationship between two brothers but, according to Ex Parte
Chace, is nevertheless prohibited, does this passive non-
recognition of a relationship between two brothers imply that the
same passive non-recognition rule exists for all relationships
between two men? 114
This is precisely what Rhode Island Governor Donald Carcieri
argued.115  The Governor's brief postulates that because the
legislature did not think it necessary to expressly proscribe an
incestuous relationship between same-sex kindred, it would
clearly be an "absurd result" to allow such a relationship for lack
of strong public policy against it.116 The Governor uses
Rosengarten v. Downes to illustrate this.117 The Governor relies
on Rosengarten to suggest that "while the lack of an explicit
statutory ban might indicate the lack of a public policy against
same sex marriage, it could also indicate that the public policy
against same-sex marriage is so strong that a statutory ban is not
necessary." 118 Thus, where there is no statutory enactment to
113. Id. § 15-1-3 (1956).
114. And, presumably, two women. Id. § 15-1-2 (1956). The incest statute
for females, does not prohibit a woman from marrying her sister, but it can be
presumed that the same public policy non-recogntion would forbid such a
union. See id.
115. See generally Brief for Governor Donald Carcieri as Amicus Curiae,
Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (No. 06-340-M.P), 2007 WL
6149056.
116. Id.at*11-12.
117. Id. at *11 (citing Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 182 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002)).
118. Id.
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suggest a strong public policy against same-sex marriage, a strong
public policy must be implied by the state's lack of desire to enact
one.119
This conclusion ignores Ex parte Chace completely, which
instructs courts to apply principles of comity and conflicts of law
analysis, asking whether Rhode Island's stated public policy
expresses any desire to not see this marriage exist.120 The answer
in Chace was to look to see if the marriage in question has been so
strongly detested that it has been deemed so by the legislature or
the judiciary.121 The inquiry was not whether a marriage was so
strongly detested in the abstract - the Chace court required
affirmative evidence.
The Governor's argument is additionally flawed because in
looking for public policy, one can only look at the statutes.
Collectively, they assert a public policy that incestuous
relationships must not exist in Rhode Island.122 It would be
absurd to reason from this that the omission of homosexual
incestuous relationships operates as an implicit acceptance of
them. They remain incestuous in character, and the companion
statutes proscribing incestuous marriages can only be read to
evidence a desire by the state to provide a blanket prohibition of
all incestuous marriages. Thus, we see the Ex parte Chace
framework in action, and Governor Carcieri would be correct: an
incestuous homosexual marriage validly performed in another
jurisdiction would not be recognized in Rhode Island because
Rhode Island law clearly evidence a strong public policy
disfavoring such incestuous marriages.
But does the omission of same-sex relationships from the
incest statutes indicate a strong public policy against permitting
same-sex marriages, including those non-incestuous? The answer
is certainly no. Public policy in Rhode Island must be founded on
119. The governor's reading of Rosengarten is flawed. While the Governor
applies the case to suggest that complete legislative silence suggests an
implicit public policy against same sex marriages, the Rosengarten court
found that strong public policy against same-sex marriages still existed
where the legislature found it unnecessary to enact a state-DOMIA because it
had defined its policy favoring the composition of marriage as between one-
man and one-woman in an earlier statute. Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 182.
120. See Exparte Chace, 58 A. at 980.
121. See id.
122. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-1-1, -2, -3 (1956).
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positive averments stating such a policy founded within express
statutory pronouncements or case law. 123 An alternative holding
would dictate that statutory silence could imply a public policy. It
would also suggest that the incest statutes cover homosexuality in
general. A court would be hard-pressed to justify such an
expansive legislative intent. The rule established by Ex parte
Chace clearly commands that public policy be shown by an express
proscription of a certain category of marriage, of which same-sex
would be a completely separate category than incestuous or
bigamous marriages.124  A public policy prohibiting non-
incestuous or non-bigamous same-sex marriages could not be
implied from its omission from statutes proscribing incestuous or
bigamous marriages.
D. Consideration of Existing Statutes Defining Marriage as
Between "A Man and a Woman"
One must next consider whether the construction of Rhode
Island's marriage statutes contained within Title 15 of the Rhode
Island General Laws, governing the issuance of marriage licenses
between man and woman, groom and bride, could also be
construed as strong public policy prohibiting same-sex
marriages.125 Rhode Island does not contain such a statute
written to define marriage as being "exclusively" between a man
and a woman, as found under the laws and mini-DOMAs of other
states. 126 These state prohibitions are, in effect, codified public
policy exceptions. 127
The dissent in Chambers reminds us that contemporary
knowledge cannot be foisted upon historical actors.128 A half
123. See Lynch, supra note 10.
124. See Exparte Chace, 58 A. at 980.
125. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-2-1 (1975) (requiring a license
from the town in which either the male or female party resides); Id. § 15-2-7
(1967) (requiring both "bride" and "groom" to subscribe to the truth of the
data submitted in their marriage license before the state or local official); Id.
§§ 15-4-1 to -17 (1957) (enumerating the various property and other rights of
married women).
126. See Kimberly N. Chehardy, Note, Conflicting Approaches: Legalizing
Same-Sex Marriage Through Conflicts of Law, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 301,
303 (2009).
127. See id. at 318.
128. See Chambers, 935 U.S. at 971 (Suttell, J., dissenting).
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century ago, the Rhode Island legislature was not thinking about
same-sex marriage when crafting a statutory codification of
marriage. Therefore, we cannot assume legislative intent to
restrict the recognition of marriage to opposite-sex couples, nor to
exclude same-sex couples. 129 A strong public policy disfavoring
same-sex marriages can only be clear when it mentions a
particular arrangement, which Rhode Island law does not.
E. Statutes and Case Law Expressing a Public Policy in Favor of
Recognition: Does it Fit in the Test?
The movement among judges to rely on statutes and case law
that favor recognizing out of state marriages is gaining
momentum. In her concurrence in Godfrey, Judge Ciparick takes
a close look at "laws of New York protect[ing] committed same-sex
couples in a myriad of ways," looking at laws bestowing visitation
rights, next-of-kin rights for hospital visitations, and rights
regarding disposition of loved ones' remains. 130 Rhode Island's
Attorney General also takes this position and has advocated for
extending the scope of strong public policy to include such
statutory rights.131
The best place to examine this type of law under the test will
be under the natural law component of the test for public policy,
where used. While courts have discussed natural law as a major
consideration in ascertaining whether there is a public policy
exception, it is little explored.132 The best discussion of this is
within Judge Ciparick's concurrence in Godfrey.133 A court, under
her analysis, must look to whether a marriage would be
"fundamentally offensive and inimical" to the public policy of the
state. Therefore, the existence of laws extending even a scintilla
of protection to same-sex couples, be it in the form of employment
and insurance benefits or adoption and parenting rights, would
suggest that such relationships are not abhorrent or somehow
129. See id.
130. Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 340 (N.Y. 2009) (Ciparick, J,
concurring).
131. See Brief of State of Rhode Island as Amicus Curiae in support of
parties, Chambers v Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (No. 2006-0340
M.P.).
132. See, e.g.,Godfrey, 920 N.E.2d 328, 338-39 (Ciparick, J, concurring).
133. Id.
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against the naturally accepted order. 134
What Judge Ciparick suggests is that the existence of any
protection for same-sex couples indeed shows that such a
relationship is not deemed abhorrent to the natural law of the
state. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has indeed recognized a
de facto parental status for the same-sex non-biological
partners. 135  The state also has no prohibition on same-sex
couples' adoption of children. 136 Additionally, Rhode Island has
expansive statutory law prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 137
F. Does Chambers Establish Strong Public Policy Disfavoring
Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriages?
It could be suggested, that by finding that the jurisdiction of
the Family Court does not extend to same sex marriage, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court was making a statement finding a
strong public policy disfavoring same-sex marriages performed
validly outside of Rhode Island. 138 This, however, cannot be true
based on the narrow issue presented to the court: whether the
Family Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. 139 The issue
presented was not same-sex marriage, and, as the court made
explicitly clear in its opinion, judgment on that issue should be
reserved for the legislature.140
An example of how courts can circumvent narrow holdings
134. See id.
135. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
136. Brief of State of Rhode Island as Amicus Curiae in support of parties,
Chambers v Ormiston at *14, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (No. 2006-0340 M.P.).
137. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (2002) (prohibiting discrimination in public
accommodations based on sexual orientation); Id. §§ 28-5-5, 28-5-5.1 to 28-5-7
(2003) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation);
Id. § 34-37-1 (1995) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in
the sale, rent, leasing or management of housing accommodations); Id. § 34-
37-4.3 (1995) (prohibiting financial institutions from discriminating based on
sexual orientation).
138. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 963 (R.I. 2007).
139. Id. at 958.
140. Id. at 967 (Suttell, J., dissenting) ("We are in complete agreement
with the majority on one critical point, however. The legal recognition that
ought to be afforded same-sex marriages for any particular purpose is
fundamentally a question of public policy, more appropriately determined by
the General Assembly after full and robust public debate.").
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that could be read to express a public policy was seen in Martinez
v. County of Monroe. There, New York's intermediate appellate
court found that the Court of Appeals' ruling in Hernandez,
rejecting the argument that same sex couples had a right under
the state constitution to receive marriage licenses did not
establish public policy that same-sex marriages performed
elsewhere could not be recognized in New York.
The Court of Appeals noted that the legislature may enact
legislation recognizing same-sex marriages and, in our view, the
Court of Appeals thereby indicated that the recognition of
plaintiffs marriage is not against the public policy of New York.
It is also worth noting that, unlike the overwhelming majority of
states, New York has not chosen, pursuant to the federal Defense
of Marriage Act [28 USC § 1738C], to enact legislation denying
full faith and credit to same-sex marriages validly solemnized in
another state.141
Although an intermediate appellate court from New York is
not binding on the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the rationale of
Martinez gives a reason why Chambers does not establish public
policy against same-sex marriage in Rhode Island. The issue in
Chambers was what the legislature intended by granting the
Family Court jurisdiction over "marriage."142  The majority
decided that the legislature's understanding was that marriage
was between a man and a woman.143 The court said that the
legislature could indeed change this characterization.1 44 Despite
whatever intent the legislature may have had, and despite their
common knowledge of the institution of marriage at the time, they
did not, and have not since, taken the explicit measure to define
the narrow class of individuals that marriage should include (or
exclude), as has been done for a variety of other marriages.
Indeed, there is support for the contention that legislative drafters
will often try to anticipate future usage of the statute that they
are drafting, and attempt to exclude such future conduct.145
141. Martinez, 50 A.D.3d 189, 192-93 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (italics in
original) (internal citations omitted).
142. See Chambers, 935 A.2d at 963.
143. Id. at 965.
144. See id.
145. Skinner, supra note 1, at 845-46 (citing Paul E. McGreal, Slighting
Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory Interpretation, 52 U.
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Ultimately, such a holding based on a narrow interpretation
of a plausible legislative intent is not clear enough to justify
prohibiting certain marriages from recognition, a conclusion that
follows from the Ex Parte Chace framework as well as the opinions
of other state courts.
CONCLUSION
The Chambers v. Ormiston decision is another layer in the
complicated history of the legal wrangling over same-sex
marriage. While the issue of same-sex marriage features
prominently in courts as one of state constitutional law, Chambers
could have been the first to add the dimension of exploring a road
to recognition through conflicts of law principles, an issue just as
divisive as a constitutional analysis. Comity, if employed today as
it was in Ex parte Chase, would clearly grant same-sex couples the
right of recognition, and the benefits it entails, in Rhode Island.146
The Chambers decision distorts the laws of comity by subjugating
it to post-hoc judgments based on a court's best guess at
legislative intent. 147
Even worse, it causes confusion regarding same-sex couples'
legal rights. Rhode Island should thus apply principles of comity
and recognize same-sex marriages. As argued by Attorney
General Patrick Lynch, there is nothing to bar recognition of
same-sex marriages performed in states and countries where it is
legal. However, when the state's highest court suggested that
married same-sex couples cannot divorce in Rhode Island, it
raised an important question: which benefits of marriage will be
recognized?
The core concept is clear: when two same-sex persons have
married in a jurisdiction that permits it, they have entered into a
legal union protected by that jurisdiction's laws. Comity grants
them protection in all states that have not explicitly indicated
whether same-sex marriages will be recognized. Because the
doctrine of comity protects all validly married couples - even
controversial ones - it should work the same with respect to same-
KAN. L. REv. 325, 367 (2004)).
146. See Exparte Chace, 58 A. at 980.
147. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 961 (R.I. 2007).
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sex couples. 148
This rationale does not apply to states that have positively
blocked this type of marriage. If same-sex couples can think of
comity as a shield that will protect them as they move from state
to state, they can think of laws explicitly barring same sex
marriage as a wall, prepared to not allow the shielded couple to
enter. Where there is no wall, the shield should defend the couple.
The argument for pursuing same-sex marriage recognition
under the doctrine of comity is particularly persuasive in Rhode
Island, surrounded on both sides by states where same-sex
marriage is legal. In New York, where recognition under comity is
gaining momentum, the state's entire eastern border abuts
jurisdictions that place no exclusions on civil marriages between
any two consenting, unmarried adults. Regardless of geography,
the comity argument should act as an avenue for same-sex couples
in states that have not chosen to proactively limit the character of
civil marriages to a more homogeneous appearance.
148. See Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159 (MA 1819).
